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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
VALIDITY OF WIS. STAT. (1954) SECTION 215.02 (18),
REGULATING ADMITTANCE IN THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN BUSINESS
The extent of discretionary licensing power which may validly be
delegated to an administrative agency in the exercise of the states'
police power is one of the knottiest problems which confronts the
courts today. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, and whether a
specific delegation is constitutional or not, primarily depends on such
factors as the nature of the business, profession or occupation to be
subject to the agency's licensing authority and recognized scope of the
police power over that business, profession or occupation.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the validity of Wis. Stats.
(1954) Sec. 215.02 (18), authorizing the commissioner of savings and
loan associations in the State of Wisconsin to accept or deny applications
to enter the savings and loan business. This section reads as follows:
The commissioner shall have discretionary power in the granting
of certificates of authority to incorporators desiring to organize
such association. He may also refuse to issue certificates of
incorporation when the plan of operation, outlined in the articles
of incorporation and the by-laws submitted, does not comply
with the statutes or the accepted and prevailing practices of
associations in this state, or when the incorporators or any of
them are not of such character, responsibility and general fitness
as to warrant the belief that the association will be conducted
for the best interests of the members; when the location of the
association is so close to an existing association that its business
might be interfered with and the support of the new association
would not be such as to assure its success; or when other good
and sufficient reasons exist for such refusal.
From a perusal of Sec. 215.02(18) as quoted above, it can be seen
that the legislature has designated three specific grounds upon which
the commissioner may deny applications: (a) if applicants do not
comply with the statutes or accepted and prevailing practices of asso-
ciations in this state, in their articles of incorporation and by-laws as
submitted to the commissioner; (b) if applicants be of such character,
responsibility and general fitness, as to warrant the belief that the asso-
ciation will not be conducted for the best interests of the members; (c)
if location of proposed association is not a sufficient distance from an
existing association, that its business might be interfered with, and the
support of the new association would not be such as to assure its
success.
Within these standards the commissioner has authority to decide
the merits of each application. This delegation of discretion would most
probably be upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of the state's
police power.
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However, Wis. Stats. (1954) §215.02 (18) also delegates to the
commissioner authority to deny applications "whenever any other good
and sufficient reasons exist for such refusal." On its face this language
appears to delegate unfettered, legislative discretion to the com-
missioner. The only standards imposed upon him are those of his own
conscience, and his decision as to what constitutes a good and sufficient
reason is apparently fiat. It is the opinion of this writer that this statute
is unconstitutional on the grounds that it delegates legislative discretion
to an individual, therefore depriving the applicants of due process and
the equal protection of the laws; and also gives authority to prohibit
rather than to regulate a lawful business.
Although the issue of the constitutionality of the various regulatory
statutes has been before the courts numerous times, the precise ques-
tion of what degree of discretion may validly be delegated to an ad-
ministrative officer to give or refuse permission to enter the savings
and loan field has not arisen. The decided cases can be distinguished by
the fact that they either deal with the regulation of savings and loan
associations already in existence, or they interpret statutes dissimiliar
to the one here discussed." The various decisions are helpful, therefore,
only insofar as the dicta they contain may indicate the attitude of the
courts toward these associations.
Since the type of business subject to the delegated licensing power
is of great importance, it is prerequisite to any discussion of the validity
of §215.02 (18), to inquire into the nature of the savings and loan
association.
These quasi-public corporations first came into existence in the
United States in 1831, when an association was organized in Pennsyl-
vania, now known as the mother state of saving and loan associations.2
With the passage of time, it was recognized that these associations, like
banks and similar financial institutions, might become dangerous to the
public welfare if not regulated properly. Statutes were enacted in the
majority of states until in some jurisdictions, the savings and loan
associations became mere creatures of statute.3
Due to the fact that these associations differ somewhat in operation,
a precise definition is difficult. The general principals and purposes of
the various associations are, however, quite similar, and subject to little
1 See, for example, State ex rel Great American Home Savings Institution et al.
v. Lee 288 Mo. 679, 133 S.W. 20, (1921) where the court held that permission
to incorporate a savings and loan association could not be denied for grounds
not specified in the statutes governing incorporation of a new association.
2 Sundheim, Law of Building and Loan Associations, 3rd ed. (1931). The author
here also points out that reasonable facsimilies of the modern savings and
loan associations have been in existence in China as early as 200 B.C.; and
they were known in England toward the end of the 18th century.
3Rocker v. Cardinal Building and Loan Association 13 NJ. Misc. 399 179 Atl.
667, (1935) White v. Wogaman. 47 Ariz. 195, 54 P.2d 793 (1936).
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dispute. As defined in Holt v. Aetna Building and Loan Association,
190 Pac. 872, 78 Okla. 307 (1920),
A building and loan association is an organization created for
the purpose of accumulating a fund by the monthly subscription
of savings of its members to assist them in building or purchas-
ing for themselves dwellings or real estate by loaning to them
the requisite money from the funds of the association upon good
security.
As indicated, a savings and loan association has two primary pur-
poses; to encourage thrift among people of moderate income, and to
aid them to borrow money for the purpose of erecting or purchasing a
home. These associations do not interfere with other lending institu-
tions.4 The court and textwriters have not failed to recognize those
aspects of the savings and loan association beneficial to the entire
community, and they have many times been highly praised.5
Probably the most important case involving a savings and loan
association in Wisconsin is State ex rel Cleary v. Hopkins Street
Building and Loan Association, 257 N.W. 684, 217 Wis. 179 (1934),6
which involved the issue of whether the Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933, to the extent that it permits the conversion of state savings and
loan associations into federal ones in contravention of the laws of Wis-
consin, is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the powers reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In
holding such an encroachment unconstitutional the court used the fol-
lowing language:
Building and loan associations are quasi-public corporations
chartered to encourage thrift and promote the ownership of
homes, with powers and immunities peculiarly their own . * *
Building and loan associations organized in Wisconsin are sub-
ject to strict supervision by administrative agencies of the state
both in the course of doing business and in that of liquidation.
As can be seen from the quote above, there is little doubt that these
associations are subject to the police power of the state.7 However,
this case again involves an association already in existence and more-
over, the strong language used by the court can probably be attributed
in part to the fact that the state's sovereignty was being threatened.
4First Nat. Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County et al, 66 Mont. 321, 213 Pac.
1097 (1923).
5 See in particular Sundheim, Law of Building and Loan Associations, Chap.
I, supra, note 2, also Rocker v. Cardinal Bldg. and Loan Ass'n of Newark,
supra, note 3, White v. Wogaman, supra, note 3; Acklin v. Peoples Saving
Association, 293 F. 392 (D.C. Ohio 1923).
6 Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted, Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Cleary, 55 S.Ct. 925, 295 U.S. 721, 79 L.Ed. 1675; affirmed 56 S.Ct.
235, 296 U.S. 315, 80 L.Ed. 251, 100 A.L.R. 1403.
See also State ex rel Schomberg v. Home Mut. Bld'g and Loan Ass'n, 220
Wis. 649, 265 N.W. 701 (1936), and Julien v. Model Bldg. and Loan Inv.
Ass'n, 116 Wis. 79, 92 N.W. 561 (1902).
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Actually, the case only illustrates the undisputed fact that the state has
the right to regulate these associations once they are incorporated.8
Nowhere, however, is there any authority to be found to sustain the
proposition that a savings and loan association is not a lawful business
which every man has a right to enter, subject to compliance with reason-
able regulations. In Brady z. Mattern 100 N.W. 358, 125 Iowa 158
(1904), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute prescribing
that only an incorporated association may carry on a savings and loan
business, the court said:
The legislature in the exercise of the police power may regulate
the conduct of building and loan associations and in its discre-
tion may limit the carrying on of such business to incorporated
associations. . . . The absolute prohibition of unincorporated
associations and individuals from engaging in the building and
loan business does not create a monopoly so long as the business
is open to all corporations complying with reasonable statutory
regulations. (emphasis added).
Being a lawful business, it would appear the general rule relating
to delegation of discretion to issue or withhold licenses is also applic-
able to savings and loan associations. As stated in 12 A.L.R. 1493-
The generally accepted rule is to the effect that a statute or
ordinance which vests arbitrary discretion with respect to an
ordinarily lawful business, profession, appliance, etc., in public
officials, without prescribing a uniform rule of action, or in other
words, which authorized the issuing or withholding of license
permits, approvals, etc., according as the designated officials
arbitrarily choose, without reference to all of the class to which
the statute or ordinance under consideration was intended to
apply, and without being controlled or guided by any definite
rules or specified conditions to which all similarily situated might
knowingly conform is unconstitutional and void.9
This rule has been expressed in various forms in almost every case
involving administrative agencies. The leading case on the subject of
delegating licensing power is probably Wick Wo., v. Hopkins (1886),
118 U.S. 356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S.Ct. 1064, where the court held invalid
an ordinance vesting arbitrary licensing power of the laundry business
in an administrative board. The decision of the court can best be
summed up in the following language.
It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that
the right of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not
by the let or leave of administrative officers or bureaus.
That the State of Wisconsin follows the general rule as stated in
8 See for example the cases cited at notes 3, 5, 6, and 7; also the annotations at
86 A.L.R. 826, 87 A.L.R. 1020, 87 A.L.R. 1149 and 12 C.J.S. Building and Loan
Associations, §4.
9 See also supplementary annotations in 54 A.L.R. 1104 and 92 A.L.R. 401, with
cases cited therein.
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A.L.R. above was illustrated as early as 1893, when the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the case of In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N.W.
1104, held that an ordinance conferring arbitrary power upon an in-
dividual to grant or deny permission to parade the streets, was un-
constitutional and void as denying equal protection of the law, quoting
with approval the Wick Wo. case, and this rule has many times been
reiterated as in the Clintonville Transfer Line, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 248 Wis. 59, 21 N.W.2d 5 (1945), where the court stated:
It is not competent for the legislature even in a circumscribed
field, to grant to an administrative agency unlimited legislative
power. The power granted must be exercised in accordance with
standards and limitations .... The power exercised by the com-
mission must be exercised in accordance with some statutory
standard fixed by the legislature or it constitutes the exercise of
the kind of legislative power that cannot be delegated.' 0
In the most recent case to come before the Wisconsin Court pre-
senting a question of this sort, the court again stated:
It is also the established law that a legislative act may validly
confer upon an agency of the government authority to grant or
to withhold a license provided that where discretion is to be
exercised by such agency proper standard or guides for the use
of the discretion are established by the act and that the act may
not be construed as conferring upon the agency the power to
exercise its discretion unreasonably, arbitrary or capriciously."
There is therefore, little doubt that the Wisconsin Court has always
recognized the general principles as heretofore expressed. It seems
that the words "good and sufficient reasons" constitute no sufficient
standard and that the delegation here in question is unconstitutional,
unless it can be maintained that it is necessary to the protection of the
public health, safety and welfare that arbitrary power be vested in
individual authorizing him to regulate admittance into the savings and
loan business for reasons good and sufficient to himself.
It has been held that if a state can exclude a business completely,
it can delegate arbitrary power to an individual to license it."2 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has in effect followed this theory in a re-
stricted line of cases, as for example in Vieau v. Common Council of
City of Chippewa Falls, 235 Wis. 122, 292 N.W. 297 (1940) where the
court held that the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors does not
come within the equality provisions of the Federal Constitution. Of
20 This case involved the refusal by the Public Service Commission to grant a
motor carrier certificate of convenience. The court here also points out that
equal protection of the law applies to the grant of privileges, as well as a
regulated right.
17 Robert C. Graebner v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 252, 68
N.W.2d 714 (1955). This case involves the constitutionality of a statute reg-
ulating the organization of an employment agency. Constitutionality of the
statute was upheld by a 4 to 3 split decision.
12Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).
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course in cases involving immediate danger to health, morals or welfare
of the general public, the justification for the exercise of the police
power is clear.
It is however, a fundamental principle of our government that the
police power of the state must be exercised in a manner reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose, and that it must not
be unduly oppressive. 3 The difficulty of course, again arises in the
application of this rule to a specific case. The writer fails to see why
it is reasonably necessary in the exercise of the police power to dele-
gate to an individual arbitrary power to regulate admittance into the
savings and loan business.
Certainly the inherent nature of a savings and loan association is
not such that merely granting authority to incorporate gives rise to
immediate danger to the public welfare.' 4 Neither can it be maintained
that once permission to organize is granted, the state relinquishes all
control over the new association. Quite on the contrary, by the terms
of Chapter 215, the state retains complete control over the operation
and liquidation of all state saving and loan associations, in addition to
regulating the organization, by prescribing rules relative to the articles
of incorporation, by-laws, character of incorporators, and location of
the proposed association.
An examination of the statutes of other states in respect to the pro-
viiions for incorporating new saving and loan associations is helpful
insofar as they indicate that definite standards can be prescribed with-
out, apparently, endangering public welfare. For example, the Illinois
Statute reads as follows:
Licenses, how obtained: Whenever any number of persons,
not less than ten (10) may desire to become incorporated as a
mutual building, loan or homestead association, for the purpose
of accumulating funds to be loaned to the members thereof only,
they shall make a statement to that effect under their hands and
seal, duly acknowledged before some officer in the manner pro-
vided for the acknowledgment of deed. Such statement shall
set forth the name of the proposed association, the capital stock
to be accumulated, its location, and the duration of the associa-
tion, which statement shall be filed in the office of the Auditor
of Public Accounts. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall
thereupon issue to such persons a license as commissioners to
open books for subscription to the shares of stock of said
association at such time and place as they may determine;
"3 An enumeration of authority here would be redundant. For Wisconsin de-
cisions on point, see for example: State v. Withrow, 280 N.W. 364, 116 A.L.R.
1310 (1938); State v. Chittendon, 134 Wis. 891, 107 N.W. 137 (1906), and
State ex rel Wisconsin Inspection Bureau et al., v. Whitman, State Comm'r
of Insurance, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
14 Sundheim, in his text Law of Building and Loan Ass'n, supra, note 2, points
out that of all financial institutions, these organizations have suffered the least
financial loss.
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provided, however, that the Auditor of Public Accounts may
withhold the issuing of a license to commissioners to open books
for subscriptions to the share of stock of said association if he
is not satisfied as to the personal character and standing of the
officers or directors to be elected or if the proposed location
would not warrant the issuance of a charter, but no charter shall
be issued to two associations having the same or similar names. 15
Although a certain amount of discretion is vested in the Auditor of
Public Accounts as to the character of the proposed incorporators, and
the location of the new association, no blanket discretion for "good and
sufficient reasons" is delegated as there is to the commissioner in Wis-
consin. In fact, the majority of states appear to have statutes closely
akin to that of Illinois. 16 None have been found that provide for the
delegation of such broad licensing discretion as does Sec. 215.02 (18).
It would seem that this fact alone indicates that the arbitrary power
given to the commissioner in Wisconsin is unnecessary.
Moreover, it can be contended that the delegation here, in effect
gives to the commissioner the power to prohibit rather than to regulate
a lawful business. He could for example, decide that no more savings
and loan associations were needed in Wisconsin, and refuse to approve
any further applications, that being good and sufficient reason by him.
Since the savings and loan association business is analogous to the
banking business,17 an examination of the statute regulating the in-
corporation of a bank in Wisconsin would perhaps best illustrate that
definite standards may be specified. Wis. Stats. (1954) Sec. 221.01 (5)
reads as follows:
The banking commission shall thereupon ascertain at the hearing
and from the best sources of information at its command, and
by such investigation as it may deem necessary, whether the
character, responsibility and general fitness of the persons
named in such application are such as to command confidence
and to warrant the belief that the business of the proposed
corporation will be honestly and efficiently conducted in accord-
ance with the intent and purpose of this chapter; and whether
public convenience and advantage will be promoted by allowing
such bank to organize; and it also shall investigate the character
and experience of the proposed officers, the adequacy of existing
banking facilities, and the need of further banking facilities,
and the need of further banking capital; the outlook for the
growth and development of the city, town or village in which
such bank is to be located, and the surrounding territory from
which patronage would be drawn; the methods and banking
practices of the existing bank or banks; the interest rate which
15 Illinois Revised Statutes (1953) Chap. 32, §214.
16 See for example Code of Iowa (1954) Chapter 534, §534.9; Ky. Rev. Stats.
(1953), §289.030; Corrick, General Stats. of Kan. Anno. Chap. 17-5201-02;
Del. Code (1954) Chap. 5, §1723; Minn. Stats. (1953), §51.07; Rev. Stats. of
Maine (1954), Chap. 59, §158.
17 Brady v. Mattern, 125 Iowa 158, 100 N.W. 358 (1904).
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they charge to borrowers; the character of the service which
they render the community, and the prospects for the success
of the proposed bank if efficiently managed. Such investigation
shall be completed within ninety days from the filing in the
office of the banking commission of proof of publication and the
making of the deposit herein required, but in the event a majority
of the applicants and the banking commission mutually agree to
it, the time may be extended an additional period of sixty days.
As can be seen, although wide discretion is vested in the banking
commission, no unfettered authority is conferred. It would appear
that the banking business is no less dangerous to financial safety, or
less complicated than a savings and loan association. In discussing the
right to enter the banking business, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
stated:
Banking is a common law right pertaining equally to every mem-
ber of the community, and cannot be prohibited under a Con-
stitution which recognizes the right and grants power to the
Legislature to regulate and supervise it....
Under the Constitution recognizing the right of all persons to
engage in the banking business and granting power to the Leg-
islature to regulate and supervise it, banking may be regulated
so far as can be reasonably necessary to secure the public welfare
and safety, but it must be true regulation and not prohibition
under the guise of regulation."'
In light of the similarity between these two financial institutions,
the court could, it seems, readily extend the rule of Weed v. Bergh to
the statute here discussed.1 9
To sum up, it is the conclusion of the writer that the delegation of
authority to the Wisconsin Commissioner of Savings and Loan Asso-
ciations would be declared unconstitutional if the issue came before the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The court might decide the words "good and sufficient reasons"
constitute a sufficient norm to satisfy the requirements of due process
and equal protection of the law, or they might hold that a savings and
loan association is of such an inherently dangerous nature that the
vesting of complete discretion in an individual is necessary for the
protection of the public welfare.
In support of the delegation in question here, it may be said that it
is of great importance that the financial stability of these associations
be maintained, since the failure of any one association might have
adverse effect on the community, and therefore, it is necessary they be
is Weed v. Bergh, 141 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664 (1910).
19 The language of the court in State ex rel Cleary v. Hopkins Street Building
and Loan Association, 217 Wis. 179, 257 N.W. 648 (1934), to the effect that
these associations are not banks, nor have the powers or privileges of banks,
would appear not to apply to the situation herein discussed.
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strictly supervised and regulated to protect the public from the evils of
such collapses. As stated in one case:
The court knows judically that building and loan associations are
financial institutions of major importance to the credit system of
the state, and that by reason of their depreciated assets owing to
a prolonged period of economic depression and lack of income
they cannot meet heavy withdrawals, and that the protection of
building and loan associations against the catastrophe of exces-
sive withdrawals is within legislative power.20
While this may be conceded, it is the opinion of the writer that any
protection which might be achieved by a provision such as contained in
215.02 (18) is negligible in the light of the fact that by it are sacrificed
not only the fundamental rights of equal protection and due process,
but also the theory of free enterprise. After all, if such arbitrary power
be allowed here, why not also in the professions, or other occupations.
Are not the same arguments available in favor of permitting law gradu-
ates to practice law in Wisconsin only upon their having received au-
thority to do so by some state agency which has the right to completely
prohibit the admission of any new members to the bar? Would not the
possible evils to be remedied be far outweighed by the evils which
might result from this system? It is the suggestion of this writer that
if the exercise of discretion by the commissioner of savings and asso-
ciations in and for the State of Wisconsin were confined to within the
definite standards as contained in Sec. 215.02 (18), no protection would
be sacrificed, and the spirit of the constitution would be preserved.
The words of Chief Justice Broadfoot in a recent case sums up the
situation clearly.
It used to be quite clear that the framers of our state and federal
constitutions did not incorporate blindly the provisions guaran-
teeing life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And it is equally
clear today that it was not intended by those framers of the
constitutions that modern efforts to insure integrity in admin-
istrative conduct of business should violate those provisions to
the extent of classifying by restriction those who may not engage
in a lawful calling to be selected by an individual. Competition
and individual enterprise have not been entirely written off as
obsolete. A conservatism that clings to the broad fundamentals
written into our bill of rights is well grounded liberalism. True
the public may be protected against the machinations of men
lacking in integrity, but that does not mean that one of several
qualified men shall be permitted to enter a legitimate field of
enterprise and the opportunity denied to others.
2 1
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20Harry M. Veix v. Seneca Bldg. and Loan Ass'n of Newark, 126 N.J.L. 314.
19 A.2d 219.
21 Robert C. Graebner v. Industrial Commission of Wis., supra, note 11, (dis-
senting opinion).
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